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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 12, 2015, thirteen-year-old James Ransom suffered a head 
injury after colliding with another player during a youth football game in Ladera 
Ranch, California.1 The hit was hard but not debilitating enough to raise 
concern.2 James played on.3 After the game, James’s father noticed dried blood 
around his son’s ear and the symptoms of a concussion beginning to set in.4 
Within days, James’s temperament changed from sweet and amiable to 
aggressive and unpredictable.5 James began suffering from oculomotor nerve 
palsy in his left eye, prolonged dizziness, nausea, and thoughts of suicide.6 His 
family sought medical and psychiatric help, but their attempts at saving James’s 
life were futile.7 On November 30, 2016, just fourteen months after the hit, James 
Ransom took his own life.8 
 
1.  About James Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., 
https://www.jameshenryransomfoundation.org/about (last visited May 30, 2019) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review). 
2.  Id. 
3.  Id. 
4.  Ryan Kartje, Ladera Ranch Family Pushes for Change in Youth Football After Loss of Son, THE 
ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Apr. 30, 2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/04/28/ladera-ranch-
family-pushes-for-change-in-youth-football-after-loss-of-son (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1.  
5.  About James Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1. 
6.  See Oculomotor Nerve Palsy, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, 
https://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/oculomotor+nerve+palsy (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “oculomotor nerve palsy” as an eye condition resulting 
from damage to the third cranial nerve and which restricts eye movement and muscle response); About James 
Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1. 
7.  About James Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1. 
8.  Id. 
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James’s story is not uncommon.9 Studies show that during practice, football 
players aged 9–12 experience high-magnitude hits 8% of the time.10 Another 
study found that youth football players are twice as likely to develop mood and 
behavioral issues in the future than their peers.11 Moreover, individuals suffering 
from a traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), caused by trauma to the head, are twice as 
likely to commit suicide than individuals without the condition.12 
Recent studies, Hollywood films, and legislation discussing the connection 
between concussions and football are creating a frenzy over the popular 
American sport.13 While many fans attempt to turn a blind eye to the commotion, 
football’s future is becoming less and less certain.14 Participation in youth 
programs dropped almost 20% after 2009, and many communities are replacing 
tackle football with programs such as flag football or “rookie tackle.”15 Class 
 
9.  See generally Ryan Kartje, Law to Ban Tackle Football for California Youth Falls Short of Committee, 
THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Apr. 30, 2018, 12:40 PM), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/04/27/law-to-
ban-tackle-football-for-california-youth-falls-short-of-committee (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (reporting on two mothers who both lost their sons to CTE). 
10.  See Catherine Thorbecke, Children Who Play Football May Take More Hits to the Head Than 
Originally Thought, Study Finds, ABC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2017, 8:17 AM ET), 
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/children-play-football-hits-head-originally-thought-study/story?id=50519830 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (finding that, out of 45 football players, accumulatively, 
the players experienced over 7,500 hits throughout 30 practices with 8% of hits considered “high magnitude,” 
[defined as greater than 40 times the force of gravity]. The study additionally found that quarterbacks, running 
backs, and linebackers were the most susceptible to high magnitude hits). 
11.  Rick Maese, Study Shows Playing Football Before Age 12 Can Lead to Mood and Behavior Issues, 
THE WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/study-shows-playing-
football-before-age-12-can-lead-to-mood-and-behavior-issues/2017/09/18/1b3ebc1c-9cac-11e7-8ea1-
ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.c5cfd4745f57 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12.  Kevin Kunsmann, Concussions, TBI Associated with Nearly Two-Fold Greater Risk of Suicide, MD 
MAGAZINE (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.mdmag.com/medical-news/concussions-tbi-associated-with-nearly-
twofold-greater-risk-of-suicide (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
13.  See What is CTE?, BRAIN INJURY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, http://www.protectthebrain.org/Brain-
Injury-Research/What-is-CTE-.aspx (last visited May 30, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (discussing Dr. Omalu’s discovery of CTE in former NFL football players); CONCUSSION (Sony 
Pictures 2015); California Youth Football Act: Hearings on A.B. 1 Before the Assemb. Comm. On Arts, 
Entertainment, Sports, Tourism, and Internet Media, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess. (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter 1 
Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing] (listing prior and related legislation on the topic of football 
safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.); see generally Noah Frank, Bad Brains: Inside the Concussion 
Crisis, WTOP (Aug. 29, 2017, 2:41 AM), https://wtop.com/nfl/2017/08/whats-happening-to-footballs-brains/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“If there’s one thing everyone WTOP spoke to for this 
series seems to agree on, it’s that there is no uniform, simple fix for the crisis of brain injury in football.”). 
14.  See generally Steve Fainaru & Mark Fainaru-Wade, For the NFL and All of Football, a New Threat: 
An Evaporating Insurance Market, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2019, 11:26 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/nfl-
football-threat-evaporating-insurance-market/story?id=60446104 (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (quoting John Butler, Pop Warner’s executive director, “People say football will never go away, 
but if we can’t get insurance, it will.”). 
15.  Alex Pew & Danielle Shapiro, MD, MPH, Football and Brain Injuries: What You Need to Know, 
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, http://www.center4research.org/football-brain-injuries-need-
know/ (last visited June 18, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); see FAQ What is 
Rookie Tackle? USA FOOTBALL, https://assets.usafootball.com/documents/rookietackle/faq.pdf (last visited July 
9, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “rookie tackle” as a bridge game 
between flag football and 11-player tackle football as to safely introduce tackle football to younger players). 
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action lawsuits against popular football leagues, such as the Pop Warner youth 
league and the National Football League (“NFL”), perpetuate the hysteria.16 
Alongside the influx of litigation, insurers are refusing to cover football 
programs; Members of the California Legislature have attempted a complete ban 
on the sport.17 
Chapter 158 compels various safety regulations for youth tackle football 
programs, mirroring regulations AB 2127 enacted for high school and middle 
school programs in 2014.18 After numerous legislative brawls over youth 
football’s viability, Chapter 158 is California’s “Hail Mary” attempt at appeasing 
opponents of youth football while still keeping the sport afloat.19 Despite 
California’s wish to walk the line, Chapter 158 fails to address the safety issues 
inherent to the sport and sets new precedent by regulating the “private” sport 
industry.20 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In the past five years, California legislators have developed a series of bills 
regarding youth football safety and standards.21 Concerned parents, retired 
football players, and medical professionals are leading the movement to address 
the topic.22 The mass support for football safety reform is due to emerging 
science and increased publicity of stories like James’s.23 Section A examines Dr. 
 
16.  See generally Micheal Martinez, Pop Warner Settles Concussion Suit Filed by Former Player Who 
Committed Suicide, CNN (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/us/pop-warner-concussion-lawsuit-
settlement-player-suicide/index.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The [Pop 
Warner] settlement demonstrates how concerns about concussion-related brain damage have grown from the 
NFL to the youngest levels of football.”).  
17.  A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not 
enacted); see Fainaru & Fainaru-Wade, supra note 14 (discussing the increase in insurance companies 
unwillingness to insure professional football against head injuries since 2011). 
18.  See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158) (outlining similar 
requirements, such as limiting full-contact practices, to AB 2127); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (enacted by 2014 
Stat. Ch. 165). 
19.  See id. (setting forth various protocols in concussion management and detection); What is Hail Mary 
(pass)?, SPORTING CHARTS, https://www.sportingcharts.com/dictionary/nfl/hail-mary-pass.aspx (last visited on 
July 14, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “Hail Mary” as a very long, 
typically unsuccessful pass made in a desperate attempt to score late in a football game). 
20.  Infra Sections IV.A–B. 
21.  See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related 
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.). 
22.  See Kartje, supra note 4 (reporting on the pleads by a family for change in youth football after the 
death of their son due to a football-caused concussion); see also Elaine Schmidt, Parents, Coaches, and Doctors 
Learn Ways to Prevent Concussions Among Young Football Players, UCLA NEWSROOM (July 9, 2014) 
http://newsroom.ucla.edu/stories/parents-coaches-and-doctors-learn-ways-to-prevent-concussion-among-young-
football-players (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the presentations of Dr. 
Christopher Giza, director of the BrainSPORT program and a professor of neurosurgery at the David Geffen 
School of Medicine at UCLA, and Patrick Larimore, former UCLA football player, on concussions at 2014 
UCLA conference).  
23.  Infra Section II.A–C.  
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Bennet Omalu’s discovery of a degenerative brain disease called Chronic 
Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) in 2002.24 Section B discusses multiple 
lawsuits against the NFL and Pop Warner in response to Dr. Omalu’s 
discovery.25 Section C evaluates various state and federal responses regarding 
concussion management.26 
A. Linking Football to Concussions: The Discovery of CTE 
In 2002, after conducting several autopsies on former NFL players, forensic 
pathologist Dr. Omalu discovered a degenerative brain disease called CTE.27 
During the postmortem examination of Mike Webster, former Pittsburgh Steeler, 
Dr. Omalu found that the constant head blows experienced by Webster caused 
microscopic injuries to the brain.28 These minor injuries led to the accumulation 
of tau proteins in the cerebral tissue and, ultimately, permanent brain damage.29 
Dr. Omalu warned that indicators of CTE—such as mood disorders, depression, 
suicidal tendencies, and disinhibition—could manifest hours after a hit or 
decades later.30 
B. Negligence Suits Against Prominent Football Leagues 
After to Dr. Omalu’s discovery, the NFL’s Mild Traumatic Brain Injury 
Committee denied any connection between football and CTE and demanded the 
renunciation of Dr. Omalu’s research.31 Despite the substantial pressure the NFL 
placed on Dr. Omalu, he continued researching and raising awareness of the 
long-term consequences associated with America’s number one sport.32 
 
24.  Infra Section II.A. 
25.  Infra Section II.B. 
26.  Infra Section II.C. 
27.  Dr. Bennet Omalu Bio, BRAIN INJURY INST., http://www.protectthebrain.org/Our-Team/Bennet-I-
Omalu-M-D-.aspx (last visited June 18, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Doctor 
Behind ‘Concussion’ Wanted to ‘Enhance the Lives of Football Players’, NPR (Dec. 27, 2015, 5:16 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2015/12/27/460870529/doctor-behind-concussion-wanted-to-enhance-the-lives-of-
football-players [hereinafter Doctor Behind ‘Concussion’] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
28.  Doctor Behind ‘Concussion’, supra note 27. 
29.  Id. 
30.  Id.; see Kristalyn Salters-Pedneault, PhD, Disinhibition (Impulsivity) in BPD, VERY WELL MIND 
(June 18, 2018), https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-disinhibition-425293 (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (defining “disinhibition” as “reduced control over your impulses, or urges, which 
means being unable to stop, delay, or change (“inhibit”) an action that it not appropriate for the situation you’re 
in.”). 
31.  See Mikayla Paolini, NFL Takes a Page from the Big Tobacco Playbook: Assumption of Risk in the 
CTE Crisis, 68, EMORY L.J. 608, 614–15 (2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(discussing the NFL’s denial Omalu’s work and subsequent orchestration of private studies claiming low 
concussion rates among NFL players). 
32.  See id. (discussing the NFL’s denial Omalu’s work and subsequent orchestration of private studies 
claiming low concussion rates among NFL players); Jim Norman, Football Still Americans’ Favorite Sport to 
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1. The National Football League Settlement 
Despite over 4,500 lawsuits against the league, the NFL denied the presence 
of CTE and other brain diseases in football players.33 After consolidating the 
lawsuits into a class-action suit, retired NFL players argued the NFL breached its 
duty to protect its players’ well-being.34 The NFL maintained that its players 
assumed the “known, apparent, and reasonably foreseeable consequences of 
athletic participation.”35 Players fought back, accusing the NFL of denying and 
actively concealing the link between football and chronic neurological 
disorders—such as CTE.36 Previous caselaw provides that courts may hold a 
sports league liable if the league fails to clearly convey the known dangers 
associated with the game.37 The lawsuit settled in 2016 with the United States 
Supreme Court affirming the $1 billion monetary award for affected players and 
their family members.38 Despite the symbolic end to an almost decade-long 
dispute, the messy details of the settlement continue to make national headlines.39 
Courts continue to deny hundreds of claims for relief by victims and their 
families, allowing the NFL pay less than half of the total payout awarded to 
plaintiffs by the Court.40 
2. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc. Settles First and Only Negligence 
Lawsuit 
In 2015, Wisconsin mother Debra Pyka sued Pop Warner—the nation’s 
 
Watch, GALLUP (Jan. 4, 2018) https://news.gallup.com/poll/224864/football-americans-favorite-sport-
watch.aspx (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“football claimed the top spot [as 
American’s most popular sport] in 1972 and has been the public’s favorite ever since.”). 
33.  Katie Moisse, Youth Football Leagues Hope for Boost from NFL Settlement, ABC NEWS (Aug. 30, 
2013), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/youth-football-leagues-hope-boost-nfl-
settlemen%20t/story?id=20120881 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
34.  Richard Weinmeyer, JD, MPhil, Concussion-Related Litigation Against the National Football 
League, AMA J. OF ETHICS (July 2014), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/concussion-related-
litigation-against-national-football-league/2014-07 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
35.  See Paolini, supra note 31 at 626–27 (discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk as applied to 
sports torts). 
36.  See id. (discussing the doctrine of assumption of risk as applied to sports torts). 
37.  E.g., Nalwa v. Cedar Fair, L.P., 55 Cal. 4th 1148, 1152 (Cal. 2012) (holding that an individual 
assumes the risk associated with bumper car collisions at an amusement park); The NFL Concussion Lawsuit, 
LAWSHELF, https://lawshelf.com/blog/post/the-nfl-concussion-lawsuit (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
38.  The NFL Concussion Lawsuit, LAWSHELF, supra note 37. 
39.  See Dom Conentino, The NFL Concussion Settlement Just Keeps Getting Worse and Worse, 
DEADSPIN (May 17, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://deadspin.com/the-nfl-concussion-settlement-just-keeps-getting-
worse-1834651117 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the recent developments 
in the NFL lawsuit). 
40.  See id. (discussing that the total payout by the NFL for all concussion-based lawsuits so far is less 
than $500 million). 
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largest youth football league—for negligence after her son committed suicide.41 
Pyka argued that her son developed CTE during his four-year stint in youth 
football, and that the disease was a substantial factor of his death in 2012.42 She 
claimed Pop Warner was liable because the program failed to limit full-contact 
practices and properly train coaches in concussion protocol and helmet safety.43 
Pyka sought $5 million in damages; however, Pop Warner settled the suit for $2 
million.44 Despite the resolution, Pop Warner accused Pyka of waging “a public 
crusade to ban football.”45 The settlement became the first and only lawsuit 
against Pop Warner but signified the growing concern over the game’s 
viability.46 
C. Legislatures Implement Various Safety Procedures Regarding Concussion 
Management 
 After the surge of litigation claiming safety oversight, football leagues 
began implementing their own changes to the sport.47 Pop Warner made 
substantive revisions, such as eliminating the three-point stance, and the NFL 
banned numerous blocks and hits formerly permitted.48 On the sidelines, federal 
and state legislatures began regulating the game’s various procedural aspects.49 
Section 1 discusses the federal government’s attempts to establish laws to 
prevent and manage concussions.50 Section 2 reviews the groundbreaking state 
laws regarding the topic.51 Section 3 analyzes California’s laws, and attempted 
laws, that regulate concussion protocol and football safety.52 
1. Federal Laws 
Although the United States Congress has not enacted any laws regarding 
 
41.  Pyka v. Pop Warner Little Scholars, Inc., No. 3:2015cv00057 (W.D. Wis. filed Feb. 5, 2015).  
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id. 
45.  Fainaru & Fainaru-Wade, supra note 14. 
46.  Josh Kosman, Youth Football May Never Be the Same After This, NEW YORK POST (March 8, 2016, 
11:06 AM), https://nypost.com/2016/03/08/pop-warner-football-settles-concussion-lawsuit/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
47.  Bob Cook, More Pop Warner Safety Changes Come As The Battle For Football’s Soul Intensifies, 
FORBES (Mar. 4, 2019) https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2019/03/04/more-pop-warner-safety-changes-
come-as-the-battle-for-footballs-soul-intensifies/#721f63087706 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
48.  Id.; see Health and Safety Rules Changes, NFL, https://operations.nfl.com/football-ops/nfl-ops-
honoring-the-game/health-safety-rules-changes/ (last visited on July 13, 2019) (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (referring to the various changes made to NFL football rules since 1985). 
49.  Infra Sections III.C.1–3 
50.  Infra Section III.C.1 
51.  Infra Section III.C.2 
52.  Infra Section III.C.3. 
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nationwide concussion management or safety, members have introduced 
legislation on the topic.53 In addition, Congress has been taking steps to address 
brain injuries in the United States since the mid-1990s.54 In 1996, President Bill 
Clinton signed the Traumatic Brain Injury Act (“TBIA”) into law.55 Notably, the 
TBIA defined a TBI and allotted federal funds for states to research and improve 
TBI rehabilitation and prevention.56 Congress reauthorized the TBIA in 2014, 
which allowed federal appropriations to continue throughout the 2019 fiscal 
year.57 
Congress also proposed the Concussion Treatment and Care Tools 
(“ConTACT”) Act in 2010 to address the “prevention, identification, treatment, 
and management of concussions.”58 The bill—which did not pass the committee 
process—proposed a nation-wide concussion guideline for youth athletes.59 It 
included a “return-to-play” protocol for purposes of post-concussion health, and 
the collection of concussion-related data among school-aged children.60 After its 
2010 failure, Congress reintroduced the ConTACT Act in 2013 but again rejected 
the bill.61 
In January 2019, Representative Joyce Beatty introduced the Concussion 
Awareness and Education Act.62 The act, not yet enacted, would collect and 
disseminate data regarding brain injuries among youths to increase the awareness 
of sports-related concussions.63 The Concussion Awareness and Education Act 
would establish a Concussion Research Commission dedicated to reviewing and 
recommending concussion-related findings.64 The Concussion Research 
Commission would also recruit the help of entities such as national sports 
associations, trainers’ associations, as well as parents, coaches, and students to 
support their findings.65 The findings would include data like the amount of 
concussions among individuals between the ages of 5–21, the cause of the 
 
53.  Elizabeth Etherton, Systematic Negligence: The NCAA Concussion Management Plan and Its 
Limitations, 21 SPORTS L. J. 1, 21 (2014) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing 
the different legislation introduced by the United States Congress on concussion management). 
54.  Id. at 22. 
55.  Id. 
56.  Id. (citing Traumatic Brain Injury Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-166, 110, Stat. 1445 (1996)). 
57.  Traumatic Brain Injury Act, BRAIN INJURY ASS’N OF AMERICA, https://www.biausa.org/public-
affairs/public-policy/traumatic-brain-injury-act (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
58.  Etherton, supra note 53 at 22-23 (2014) (quoting Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2012, 
H.R. 1247, 111th Cong. (2010)). 
59.  Id. (quoting Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2012, H.R. 1247, 111th  Cong. (2010)). 
60.  Id. at 23 (discussing Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2012, H.R. 1247, 111th Cong. 
(2010)). 
61.  Concussion Treatment and Care Tools Act of 2013, H.R. 3113, 113th Cong. (2013). 
62.  H.R. 280, 116th Cong. (2019). 
63.  Id. 
64.  Id. 
65.  Id. 
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concussions, and the injured individual’s concussion history.66 
2. State Laws 
In 2009, Washington became the first state to pass a law implementing a 
concussion protocol in sports.67 The Lystedt Law, also known as the “shake-it-off 
law,” prevents youth athletes from prematurely returning to play after showing 
signs of a head injury.68 Just one month after the passage of the Lystedt Law, 
Oregon passed Max’s Law—a similar piece of legislation.69 Max’s Law 
implemented concussion management guidelines—such as the catchy “recognize, 
remove, refer, return,” protocol for all school districts in the state.70 Since the 
passage of Max’s and the Lystedt Laws, all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted laws implementing concussion procedures in youth 
and/or high school sports.71 
3. California Laws 
California has implemented several legislative measures to address concerns 
surrounding football safety.72 In 2014, Governor Brown signed AB 2127 into 
law.73 AB 2127 limited full contact practices and required concussed student-
athletes to complete a seven-day graduated “return-to-play” protocol.74 Since the 
bill restricts full-contact practice time, Senator Joel Anderson called the bill “an 
overreach.”75 Anderson and other bill opponents argued that the government 
should not regulate substantive aspects of football, such as full-contact practice 
and player conduct.76 However, AB 2127 passed and took effect on January 15, 
 
66.  Id. 
67.  Get a Heads Up on Concussion in Sports Policies, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/headsup/pdfs/policy/HeadsUpOnConcussionInSportsPolicies-a.pdf (last visited June 22, 
2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
68.  Id. 
69.  Id. 
70.  See S. Res. 348, 75th Leg., 2009 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009) (“Each school district shall ensure that 
coaches receive annual training to learn how to recognize the symptoms of a concussion and how to seek proper 
medical treatment for a person suspected of having a concussion.”). 
71.  Concussion ToolKit for Psychologists, AMERICAN PSYCH. ASS’N, 
http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/colleges/medicalschool/departments/pmr/documents/concussion_toolkit/la
ws/state.htm (last visited June 20, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
72.  See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related 
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.). 
73.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (enacted by 2014 Stat. Ch. 165).  
74.  Id. 
75.  Patrick McGreevy & Eric Sondheimer, New Law Restricts Full-Contact Football Practice for High 
School Teams, LA TIMES (July 21, 2014, 8:06 PM), https://www.latimes.com/sports/highschool/la-sp-high-
school-football-20140722-story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
76.  Id. 
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2015.77 
Two years after AB 2127 passed, the Legislature passed AB 2007—also 
known as the Concussion Management in Youth Sports Act.78 AB 2007 
expanded AB 2127 and implemented several protocols to educate football 
coaches, parents, and athletes from twenty-seven different youth sports programs 
on concussion symptoms.79 Mike Chisar, Government Affairs Committee Chair 
for the California Athletic Trainers’ Association, claimed AB 2127 “place[d] 
California at the forefront of . . . concussion management at the youth sports 
level.”80 
Assembly Members Kevin McCarty and Lorena Gonzalez proposed AB 
2108 in 2017, which sought to completely ban youth football for all children 
under the age of twelve.81 AB 2108 omitted all praise of youth football and aimed 
to eradicate the problems associated with the sport, such as TBIs.82 Despite the 
radical proposition, Assembly Member McCarty denied the bill was an 
overreach.83 He maintained that he had “an obligation to protect children from 
dangerous, long-term injuries.”84 In fact, several other states—including New 
York, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey—proposed similar bans during the 
same year.85 However, AB 2108 and all other bills attempting to ban youth 
football met powerful public backlash and quickly failed.86 
III. CHAPTER 158 
Chapter 158, also known as the California Youth Football Act, implements 
an extensive safety scheme for all youth tackle football programs in California.87 
Chapter 158 limits full-contact practices to thirty minutes per practice with no 
more than two full-contact practices per week.88 Additionally, the California 
Youth Football Act also prohibits all contact training during the youth program’s 
 
77.  AB 2127 – Concussions and Head Injuries: Full-Contact Football Practices, KINGSLEY BOGARD 
LLP (July 22, 2014) https://kblegal.us/ab-2127-concussions-and-head-injuries-full-contact-football-practices/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
78.  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49475 (enacted by 2014 Stat. Ch. 165); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124235 
(enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516).  
79.  HEALTH & SAFETY § 124235 (enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516). 
80.  Id.; Governor Signs Concussion Management Measure Into Law, CALIFORNIA ATHLETIC TRAINERS’ 
ASS’N, https://ca-at.org/governor-signs-concussion-management-measure-into-law/ (last visited June 20, 2019) 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
81.  A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not 
enacted). 
82.  Id. 
83.  Kartje, supra note 9. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  Id. 
87.  See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158); Assembly Committee, Floor 
Analysis of SB 1, 2019 Leg., 2019–2020 Sess., at 1 (Cal. 2019). 
88.  HEALTH & SAFETY § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158). 
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off-season.89 
Chapter 158 also implements various off-the field procedural regulations.90 
Chapter 158 requires youth football programs to organize divisions by relative 
weight, age, or a combination of weight and age.91 Additionally, coaches must 
conduct a ten-hour minimum of non-contact practice at the beginning of each 
season to acclimate players to equipment and tackle safety.92 Chapter 158 also 
requires coaches to attend yearly head injury training and complete a nationally-
recognized tackling and blocking certificate.93 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The California Youth Football Alliance hails Chapter 158 as a “nationwide 
model for best practices in youth football,” aligning California with seven other 
states regulating the sport.94 However, just one year prior to the enactment of 
Chapter 158, the same alliance condemned the legislature for overstepping its 
authority in proposing AB 2108.95 Parents, coaches, and fans across California 
united to oppose the bill banning tackle football for all children under the age of 
12, quickly killing it.96 Despite its milder appearance, Chapter 158 is no 
different.97 
California’s most recent attempt at appeasing everyone, in reality, appeases 
few.98 Persons against youth football argue Chapter 158 lacks true initiatives to 
protect California’s youth.99 Conversely, strong supporters of football argue that 
Chapter 158 exceeds the Legislature’s authority by regulating a parent and 
coach’s right to choose.100 While Chapter 158 is an honest effort at keeping youth 
players safe, it neither exemplifies innovation in concussion management nor 
follows past precedent allowing private sports entities to self-regulate.101 
 
89.  Id. 
90.  Id. 
91.  Id. 
92.  Id. 
93.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158). 
94.  1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (statement by California Youth 
Football Alliance); Cindy Bowen, Amid Growing Concern Over Head Injuries California Limits Full-Contact 
Football Practices, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-
lead/wp/2014/07/22/amid-growing-concern-over-head-injuries-california-limits-full-contact-football-
practices/?noredirect=on (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
95.  Kartje, supra note 9. 
96.  Kartje, supra note 9. 
97.  See Dionne L. Koller, Putting Public Law into “Private” Sport, 43 PEPP. L. REV., 681, 682–83 
(2016) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the government’s “hands-off” 
approach to regulating sports and the new era of regulation via concussion management laws). 
98.  See generally id. at 716–18 (discussing the critical view of concussion management laws). 
99.  Id. at 719. 
100.  Id.; see McGreevy & Sondheimer, supra note 75 (discussing Sen. Joel Andersons rejection of 
similar bill, AB 2127, over concerns of legislative overreach in regulating full-contact practice time). 
101.  See generally id. at 716–18 (discussing the skeptical view of government regulation in sports); see 
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Section A evaluates California’s right to regulate private sports, such as the 
leagues Chapter 158 would impact.102 Section B analyzes the United States’ 
precedent of allowing American sports leagues to largely regulate themselves.103 
Section C analyzes whether this model of autonomy is laudable or even viable.104 
A. California’s Power to Regulate Private Sport 
The state’s police power is the “power to govern–the inherent reserved power 
of the state to subject individual rights to reasonable regulation for the general 
welfare.”105 The state may regulate anything that aims to further the peace, 
safety, morals, health, or welfare of the public.106 Police power is valid unless the 
court deems the law “unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and has no . . . 
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.”107 
Chapter 158 is undisputedly a valid exercise of California’s police power.108 
Chapter 158 seeks to protect the state’s youth football players from the severe 
and long-term effects of brain injuries.109 However, despite its legitimate exercise 
of authority, Chapter 158 trailblazes a relatively new frontier: regulating the 
private sports industry.110 
B. Self-Regulation in American Sports 
The government’s lack of intervention in the private sports industry draws 
similar comparisons with other burgeoning industries.111 In 2019, the Federal 
Aviation Administration (“FAA”) drew criticism after news broke that the 
agency delegated virtually unchecked authority to the Boeing Company to certify 
 
McGreevy & Sondheimer, supra note 75 (discussing AB 2108 overreach into coaches and parents right to 
choose and coach). 
102.  Infra Section IV.A. 
103.  Infra Section IV.B. 
104.  Infra Section IV.C. 
105.  Massingill v. Dep’t. of Food & Agric., 102 Cal. App. 4th 498, 504 (2002). 
106.  See id. at 503 (2002) (holding that the air and water are essential to the safe operation of motor 
vehicle and therefore a law mandating the free issuance of such services at gas stations is a proper exercise of 
the state’s policing powers). 
107.  Id. at 504 (2002). 
108.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158); see generally Massingill, 102 
Cal. App. 4th at 504 (2002) (holding that the air and water are essential to the safe operation of motor vehicle 
and therefore a law mandating the free issuance of such services at gas stations is a proper exercise of the state’s 
policing powers). 
109.  HEALTH & SAFETY § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158). 
110.  See generally id. (enacting mandates that regulate the private sports industry, such as youth football 
leagues, like Pop Warner football); infra Section IV.A–D. 
111.  See Brian Naylor, Boeing’s Not Alone in Companies That Government Agencies Have Let Self-
Regulate, NPR (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/02/709203191/boeings-not-alone-in-companies-
that-government-agencies-have-let-self-regulate (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(discussing the self-regulation of Boeing aircrafts by the FAA). 
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its own 737 MAX jets.112 The public has also chastised the Federal Railroad 
Administration and the Food and Drug Administration for allowing self-
regulation within their agencies.113 While the public criticizes such government 
entities for their lack of supervision, some scholars argue that agencies simply 
lack the resources, expertise, or technology to probe fast-evolving industry 
standards.114 
A similar dilemma faces the sports industry.115 American sports fans argue 
the precedent for allowing private sports associations to self-regulate should 
continue, while opponents contend that government intervention is key.116 
Subsection 1 outlines the history of limited government intervention in American 
sports.117 Subsection 2 illustrates this same trend in Olympic sports.118 Subsection 
3 analyzes the lack of government intervention in interscholastic and 
intercollegiate sports, and Subsection 4 discusses self-regulation in professional 
sports.119 Finally, Subsection 5 reviews California’s historical deference towards 
the sports industry within the state.120 
1. Historic Background of the “Hands-Off” Approach 
Unlike the 2019 FAA/Boeing incident, there is currently no government 
entity responsible for the over 21.5 million children playing team sports in 
America.121 Many scholars refer to America’s youth and amateur sports structure 
as the “Wild West.”122 Despite the nickname, the government has seemingly 
designed the chaotic nature of American sports.123 The notion that governments 
should stay out of sports stems from the individualized, private, and voluntary 
 
112.  Id.; see Emily Stewart, Delta’s CEO says the Boeing 737 Max 8 Scandal Has “Traumatized” the 
Aviation Industry, VOX (June 11, 2019), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/6/11/18657008/ed-bastian-delta-
boeing-737-max-scandal (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the Boeing 
Company’s, an American corporation that designs, manufactures, and sells airplanes, 737 MAX jet airplane’s 
involvement in two crashes within a span of months). 
113.  Naylor, supra note 111. 
114.  Id. 
115.  Infra Sections IV.A–D. 
116.  See Koller, supra note 97 at 682 (2016) (discussing John McCain’s belief that government should 
involve themselves in sports as little as possible); see McGreevy & Sondheimer, supra note 75 (discussing 
Legislators belief that concussion laws are an overreach by the state). 
117.  Infra Section IV.B.1. 
118.  Infra Section IV.B.2. 
119.  Infra Sections IV.B.3–4. 
120.  Infra Section IV.B.5. 
121.  Bruce Kelley & Carl Carchia, “Hey Data Data—Swing!,” ESPN (July 16, 2013), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/story/_/id/9469252/hidden-demographics-youth-sports-espn-magazine (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
122.  Id. 
123.  See Koller, supra note 97 at 685–589 (discussing the popular American view that the government 
should stay out of the business of regulating sports).  
2020 / Addressing the Hit Against America’s Number One Sport 
346 
nature of the industry.124 Other scholars argue that the hands-off approach is due 
to American’s “mystique, nostalgia, and romantic…cultural fixation” on sports 
that government officials refuse to tinker with.125 The government’s laissez-faire 
approach extends to amateur, interscholastic, intercollegiate, and even 
professional sports.126 
2. Self-Regulation in Olympic Sports 
In 1977, President Ford created the Commission on Olympic Sports, 
encouraging the United States to rely on free enterprise—rather than federal 
regulations—to help finance amateur athletes.127 This non-interventionist concept 
stemmed from American’s distaste towards communist Olympic opponents 
during the Cold War.128 Congress followed, creating the United States Olympic 
Committee—a federally chartered, non-profit, patriotic corporation––which 
recruited privately-incorporated National Governing Bodies to support the 
nation’s Olympic athletes.129 
3. Self-Regulation in Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Sports 
The federal government has also granted generous legal sovereignty to 
intercollegiate and interscholastic sports.130 Since its inception in 1906, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) has regulated intercollegiate 
athletics with “tremendous judicial deference and goodwill.”131 Courts have also 
denied constitutional protections to interscholastic athletes, maintaining that 
participation in athletics is a privilege, not a right.132 When disputes arise 
regarding internal sports issues—such as eligibility matters and rules of plays—
courts typically defer to the sports bodies to manage themselves.133 
 
124.  Id. at 689. 
125.  See id. at 685 (quoting James H. Frey & D. Stanley Eitzen, Sport and Society, 17 ANN. REV. SOC. 
503, 503–04 (1991)). 
126.  Id. at 688. 
127.  Dionne L. Koller, How the United States Government Sacrifices Athletes’ Constitutional Rights in 
the Pursuit of National Prestige, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1465, 1477 (2008). 
128.  Koller, supra note 97 at 689; Koller, supra note 127. 
129.  Koller, supra note 97 at 690. 
130.  Id. at 691. 
131.  Id. at 692. 
132.  See Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 504 F. Supp. 2d 88, 100 (W.D. Va. 2007) 
(maintaining that the participation in interscholastic athletics was a privilege, thus the Fourteenth Amendment 
does not protect such a privilege). 
133.  See generally Crane by Crane v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 975 F.2d 1315, 1319–20 (7th Cir. 
1992) (holding there was no legal remedy for a student’s ineligibility to participate in a sport program due to 
injury); see also Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 627–28 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that 
a professional skier’s inability to take paid endorsements while playing college football did not entitle him to 
injunctive relief). 
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4. Self-Regulation in Professional Sports 
Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to substitute their own rationale for 
that of professional sports leagues.134 Courts grant sports league commissioners 
“best interests of the sport” authority when regulating internal league affairs.135 
The autonomy sports commissioners enjoy surpasses the deference corporate 
board members and company presidents possess.136 
In Charles O. Finley & Company v. Kuhn, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Bowie Kuhn—Major League Baseball’s (“MLB”) 
commissioner—denying club trades was not arbitrary or capricious because 
Kuhn did not violate any MLB rules.137 The court observed commissioners have 
broad discretion to prevent actions that are not in the best interest of the sport, so 
long as the acts are in good faith.138 The Seventh Circuit maintained that a 
decision by the court on the matter would be “beyond the competence and the 
jurisdiction of this court to decide.”139 
5. California’s Deference to Youth Sports Leagues 
While the state legislature and courts can regulate youth sports, they are as 
reluctant as the rest of the nation to impose regulations on the industry.140 
California courts are particularly hesitant when holding sports leagues and 
voluntary entities liable in negligence suits.141 In Balthazor v. Little League 
Baseball, Inc., a pitch injured a minor, and the family sued the baseball 
organization for not providing players with helmets equipped with face guards.142 
The court held that, under the primary assumption of risk doctrine, a sports 
league only has a duty not to increase the risks inherent to the sport—not a duty 
to decrease them.143 The court asserted that mandating organizations to provide 
equipment to avoid injuries inherent to the game would have “enormous social 
and economic consequences” on the sport.144 
 
134.  Matthew J. Mitten, How Is the Integrity of Sport Protected in the United States, 19 TEX. REV. ENT. 
& SPORTS L. 89, 103 (2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. at 104. 
137.  Charles O. Finley Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1978). 
138.  Id. at 539  
139.  Id.  
140.  See generally Balthazor v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 47, 48–49 (1998) (denying 
relief to youth baseball player after a baseball hit him in face during a youth game). 
141.  See generally id. (1998) (denying relief to youth baseball player after a baseball hit him in face 
during a youth game). 
142.  Id. at 49 (1998). 
143.  Id. 
144.  Id. at 52 (1998). 
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C. Analysis of Non-Interventionist Model in Sports: The Pros and Cons 
While the United States historically allowed the sports industry to primarily 
regulate itself, individuals often question the sensibility of such a structure.145 
This section analyzes the pros and cons of America’s current autonomous sports 
industry and explores the viability of such a model in the future.146 Section 1 
analyzes the argument that concussion management laws are ineffective within 
the United States.147 Section 2 discusses how sports leagues already 
predominantly regulate themselves without the help of the Legislature.148 Section 
3 outlines how the increasing professionalization of youth sports demands 
uniform regulation of programs—like Pop Warner—to protect the state’s 
youths.149 
1. Pros: Concussion Management Laws are Ineffective 
Critics of sports regulations argue Chapter 158, and other state mandates, are 
ineffective in preventing brain injuries from occurring.150 While Chapter 158 and 
various other state laws address concussion management after receipt of injury, 
no one law seeks absolute preemption.151 Most laws, such as Washington’s 
Lystedt Law and California’s own Concussion Management in Youth Sports Act, 
mandate return-to-play protocols—not substantive changes to the game.152 Dan 
Comstock, professor at Ohio State University’s Center for Injury Research and 
Policy, criticized the states’ newly enacted laws.153 “Not a single piece of any of 
these laws is going to keep a kid from getting a concussion in the first place,” 
exclaimed Comstock.154 Legislatures must mandate changes to the substance of 
the game—not just to the protocols after the fact—to be effective at preventing 
concussions.155 
Additionally, critics argue concussion laws may actually have an inverse 
effect on concussion safety.156 Because concussion laws lack the ability to 
 
145.  Infra Section IV.C.3. 
146.  Infra Sections IV.C.1–3. 
147.  Infra Section IV.C.1 
148.  Infra Section IV.C.2. 
149.  Infra Section IV.C.3. 
150.  Koller, supra note 97 at 716. 
151.  See Maggie Clark, Sports Concussion Laws Are a Headache for States, GOVERNING (July 20, 
2012), http://www.governing.com/news/state/mct-sports-concussion-bills-headache-for-state-lawmakers.html 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the lack of legislative efforts addressing 
concussion prevention, but rather only management). 
152.  Get a Heads Up on Concussion in Sports Policies, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
supra note 67; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124235 (enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516).  
153.  Clark, supra note 151. 
154.  Id. 
155.  See generally id. (discussing the inability of concussion management laws to prevent concussions).  
156.  Koller, supra note 97 at 717–18. 
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prevent brain trauma, critics claim that concussion laws may produce a false 
sense of safety among parents and players.157 In return, this distortion may result 
in additional injuries and concussions among players.158 However, persons in 
favor of concussion laws argue they achieve their primary objective—bringing 
awareness to concussions—and thus are effective.159 
2. Pros: Sports Leagues Already Regulate Themselves 
Independent of government intervention, private leagues are already taking 
initiatives to make their sport safer.160 Pop Warner spearheaded the change in 
2012 by limiting full-contact drills to no more than twenty-five percent of 
practice time.161 USA Football, the umbrella organization to all amateur football 
leagues—includes Pop Warner—implemented the “Heads Up Football” program 
across all fifty states.162 The mandatory program integrated smart tackling 
techniques, equipment fitting, and coaching certification into youth and high 
school leagues—including Pop Warner.163 In May 2016, Pop Warner announced 
that it would eliminate kickoffs—a method in football often responsible for 
concussions—in its three youngest divisions.164 In addition to the changes at the 
youth level, the NFL has also implemented changes to make professional football 
safer.165 Among various reforms, the NFL outlawed the three-man wedge block 
during kick-offs and any intentional helmet-to-helmet contact.166 Critics of 
government intervention argue these internal changes are more effective in 
preventing concussions among players than government regulations.167 
 
157.  Id. at 718. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Sungwon Kim and Denial P. Connaughhton, Legislative Efforts to Reduce Concussions in Youth 
Sports: An Analysis of State Concussion Statutes, J. LEG. ASPECTS OF SPORTS 27, 162–186 (2017) (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
160.  See Jill Martin, Pop Warner Eliminates Kickoffs, CNN (May 12, 2016, 6:44 PM), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/12/sport/pop-warner-football-eliminates-kickoffs/ (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on Pop Warner’s policy banning kickoffs for its three youngest divisions).  
161.  Id. 
162.  Moisse, supra note 33. 
163.  Heads Up Football for Youth Leagues and Clubs, USA FOOTBALL, 
https://usafootball.com/programs/heads-up-football/youth/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2019) (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review).  
164.  Martin, supra note 160. 
165.  See Kevin Seifert, What’s Really Changed in the NFL’s ‘Call to Action’ On Concussions, ESPN 
(Sep. 21, 2018), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/24743994/really-changed-nfl-call-action-concussions (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (discussing the various reforms that the NFL has 
implemented since their 2018 “call to action” on concussions). 
166.  See id. (defining a “wedge block” as a strategy used during a kickoff when three players link 
shoulder-to-shoulder and advance to block the cover team). 
167.  Koller, supra note 97 at 718. 
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3 Cons: The “Professionalization” of Youth Sports 
Studies show that seventy percent of children who play youth sports quit by 
age thirteen due to “unpleasant sports experiences.”168 Scholars argue this 
dramatic drop in participation is due to the growing “professionalization” of 
youth sports in America.169 With non-profit youth sports programs earning over 
$5 billion in revenue each year, individuals argue Pop Warner and other youth 
leagues are now “big business.”170 
Those opposing self-regulation of youth sports maintain the Legislature must 
draw a line between professional sports and youth and interscholastic sports.171 
With youth football feeder programs becoming increasingly popular, competition 
and rivalry have replaced core values such as teamwork and personal growth.172 
A statistic from the Center for Disease Control reveals medical professionals 
treat over 3.5 million children under the age of fourteen for sports-related injuries 
per year.173 Proponents of government regulation argue that this influx in injuries 
summons a need for more federal and state intervention throughout youth 
sports.174 
D. The Future of Youth Sports in America: Continued Changes to Come 
With Chapter 158 and various new laws taking effect, actors within the youth 
football sphere wonder what the future holds for the sport.175 Despite sports 
leagues’ previous autonomy, state and federal courts are beginning to hold them 
more accountable in concussion-related negligence suits.176 Grieving mothers, 
Kimberly Archie and Jo Cornell, filed a lawsuit against the Pop Warner football 
league in 2016 after the CTE-related deaths of their sons, Paul Bright Jr. and 
Tyler Cornell, respectively.177 In a landmark decision, United States District 
Court judge Paul Gutierrez ruled that the negligence suit would continue on to 
 
168.  Jordan D. Cox, The Professionalization of Youth Sports in America, BAYLOR DEP’T. OF AMERICAN 
STUDIES, 2 (Aug. 2011), https://baylor-
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171.  Koller, supra note 97 at 718. 
172.  James R. Andrews, Why are There So Many Injuries to Our Young Athletes? Professionalization 
and Specialization in Youth Sports, 40 BALTIMORE L. REV. 575, 577 (2010) (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
173.  Id. at 576. 
174.  Id. at 580–81. 
175.  Cook, supra note 47. 
176.  Ryan Kartje, Pop Warner Facing 2020 Trial in Lawsuit Alleging Negligence, Wrongful Death, THE 
OC REGISTER (July 26, 2018), https://www.ocregister.com/2018/07/26/pop-warner-facing-2020-trial-in-lawsuit-
alleging-negligence-wrongful-death/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
177.  Id. 
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trial.178 The trial, set for January 2020, will mark Pop Warner’s first since the 
league’s inception in 1929.179 Despite the case’s uncertain verdict, it signals a 
new movement towards holding sports leagues more accountable for the safety of 
its players.180 
In addition to courts holding sports leagues more responsible, California’s 
Legislature has also proposed various measures that would impose greater 
regulations on leagues.181 Discussed previously, AB 2108 would have banned 
youth football for all players under the age of 12.182 Although the measure failed, 
its occurrence displays a slow but growing crusade against youth football in 
California.183 Co-authors of AB 2108, McCarty and Gonzalez, have pledged their 
continued commitment to reforming youth football within the state.184 
While past regulations have predominantly dealt with protocols off the field, 
more recent bills—such as AB 2108, AB 2007, and Chapter 158—mandate 
substantive changes to the game.185 These changes include restricting full-contact 
practice time and complete constraints on the ability to play the game based on 
age.186 The Legislature’s increased comfort in regulating the substance of youth 
and interscholastic football displays another growing trend: preventative 
regulations that may end with youth football’s complete demise.187 
V. CONCLUSION 
Stories like James Ransom’s have kick-started a massive movement towards 
the reformation of youth football within California.188 Chapter 158 continues this 
reform, implementing numerous regulations regarding concussion management 
 
178.  Id. 
179.  Id. 
180.  See generally id. (discussing the recent and unprecedented lawsuit against Pop Warner for 
negligence). 
181.  See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related 
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182.  A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not 
enacted). 
183.  See id. (proposing the prohibition of tackle football for all children under the age of 12). 
184.  Kartje, supra note 9. 
185.  See 1 Assembly Committee on A.E.S.T.I.M. Hearing, supra note 13 (listing prior and related 
legislation on the topic of football safety, such as AB 379, AB 2108, AB 2800, etc.). 
186.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§ 124235 (enacted by 2016 Stat. Ch. 516); A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as 
introduced on Feb. 8, 2018, but not enacted). 
187.  See generally A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 
2018, but not enacted) (proposing the complete ban of youth football for children under the age of 12); see also 
Kartje, supra note 9 (reporting on legislator McCarty and Gonzalez’s plan to continue reforming football 
despite the failure of their co-authored bill, AB 2108). 
188.  See Kartje, supra note 176 (discussing the recent lawsuit going to trial in 2020 against the Pop 
Warner football league).  
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and safety.189 Despite its good intentions, Chapter 158 fails to enact any 
groundbreaking protocols and breaks precedent by regulating the private sports 
industry.190 
Chapter 158 disrupts the government’s traditional grant of sports’ autonomy 
and symbolizes the growing trend towards government regulation of sports.191 
While many individuals welcome the reform, ardent football fans argue 
concussion laws are ineffective and sports leagues are better equipped to regulate 
themselves.192 However, as the Boeing catastrophe displayed, unregulated 
industries can often foster unsafe environments.193 Supporters of concussion laws 
argue that the growing professionalization of youth sports requires regulatory 
oversight.194 
Attempting to walk the line between both sides, Chapter 158 falls short.195 Its 
regulations lack substantive changes that prevent concussions, while still 
managing to disrupt previous sports league deference.196 Despite its tepid impact, 
Chapter 158 signifies the beginning of a long battle for youth football’s 
survival.197 With courts and legislatures more willing to hold football leagues 
accountable for failing to protect its players, the future of football hangs in the 
balance.198 Despite Chapter 158’s practical shortcomings, it begins an important 
dialogue on the balances between private regulations and public welfare.199 
Regardless of whether concussion safety or youth football prevails, in the end, 
one thing is for sure: James Ransom’s death was not in vain.200 
 
189.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158). 
190.  Infra Sections IV.A–B. 
191.  See Koller, supra note 97 at 716–18 (discussing the government’s historical precedent of allowing 
the sports industry to regulate itself and the impact of concussion laws on this standard). 
192.  Id. at 719. 
193.  See Naylor, supra note 111 (discussing the self-regulation of Boeing aircrafts by the FAA). 
194.  Andrews, supra note 172 at 580-81. 
195.  See generally Koller, supra note 97 at 716–18 (discussing the critical view of concussion 
management laws). 
196.  See generally id. (discussing the skeptical view of government regulation in sports). 
197.  See generally A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 
2018, but not enacted) (proposing the complete ban of youth football for children under the age of 12); see also 
Kartje, supra note 9 (reporting on legislator McCarty and Gonzalez’s plan to continue reforming football 
despite the failure of their co-authored bill, AB 2108). 
198.  See generally A.B. 2108, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as introduced on Feb. 8, 
2018, but not enacted) (proposing the complete ban of youth football for children under the age of 12); see also 
Kartje, supra note 9 (reporting on legislator McCarty and Gonzalez’s plan to continue reforming football 
despite the failure of their co-authored bill, AB 2108). 
199.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 124240 (enacted by Chapter 158). 
200.  About James Henry Ransom, JAMES HENRY RANSOM FOUND., supra note 1. 
